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DESCARTES ON THE INTELLECTUAL NATURE OF HUMAN 
SENSE PERCEPTION: FROM THE INNERMOST SELF TO THE 
MATERIAL WORLD 
 
DESCARTES SOBRE LA NATURALEZA INTELECTUAL DE LA 








In this essay, I argue that a proper understanding of the Cartesian proof of the 
external world sheds light on some vexatious questions concerning his theory of sense 
perception. Three main points emerge from the discussion: a picture of the mind, 
conceived as the power of understanding, as essentially related to the physical world; 
an extension of rationality such that it includes a set of necessities that neither can be 
deduced from the principles furnished by pure understanding alone nor are to be 
found among the particular items of sense experience; and a conception of human 
sense perception as a composite power that includes sensory awareness as well as 
understanding, and so that establishes a sharp distinction between human and animal 
sensory awareness. As far as agency is a constitutive ingredient of human sense 
perception, Descartes’ doctrine is in line with some current versions of a virtue 
epistemology. 
 




En este artículo, argumento que una comprensión adecuada de la prueba 
cartesiana del mundo externo arroja luz sobre varios problemas, aparentemente 
intratables, que permean su teoría de la percepción sensorial. Tres aspectos 
sobresalientes emergen de la argumentación: un modelo según el cual la mente, 
164                                                                                  Modesto Gómez-Alonso 
Análisis. Revista de Investigación filosófica, Vol. 2, n.º 1 (2015): 163-193	  
concebida como la capacidad de comprensión, se encuentra constitutivamente 
vinculada al mundo físico; una extensión de la racionalidad que incluye entre 
sus componentes un grupo de necesidades que ni pueden deducirse 
únicamente de los principios básicos del entendimiento puro ni se encuentran 
entre los objetos concretos de la experiencia sensorial; y una concepción de la 
experiencia sensorial humana de acuerdo a la cual ésta es un poder compuesto 
que incluye tanto consciencia fenoménica como ejercicio intelectual, de forma 
que se establece una distinción tajante entre la sensación animal y la humana. 
En la medida en que la agencia es un ingrediente constitutivo de la percepción 
sensorial humana, la doctrina propuesta por Descartes es análoga a algunas 
versiones actuales de epistemología de virtudes.  
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Comprensión intelectual; ideas materialmente falsas; mundo 
externo; percepción sensorial; racionalidad extendida.   
 
Analysis shows the true way by means of which the thing in question was discovered 
methodically and as it were a priori, so that if the reader is willing to follow it and give 
sufficient attention to all points, he will make the thing his own and understand it just as 
perfectly as if he had discovered it for himself. But this method contains nothing to compel belief 
in an argumentative or inattentive reader; for if he fails to attend even to the smallest point, he 
will not see the necessity of the conclusion. 
AT VII 155-56 / CSM II 110  
 
In this paper I argue that, given the strict conditions imposed by radical 
scepticism on the Meditations’ proof of the external world, such a proof might 
only be successful if its starting point is epistemologically certain as well as 
unintelligible in terms of a narrow self. This means that the Cartesian proof has 
to be conceived as a transcendental argument whose crucial premise is that one is 
the subject of propositional thinking regarding particular objects, and which, 
through an examination of the conditions for the possibility of such a thinking, 
is able to yield the result that the existence of an intelligible external world is 
such a condition. In this sense, the success of the proof depends on whether 
Descartes is successful in supporting the claims that, insofar as in a restricted 
sense the self is nothing else that unconditional understanding, it is per se 
unable to explain our recognitional powers, and that those powers are 
operative despite the sceptical scenarios advanced in the First Meditation. This 
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is why the proof depends both on the argument for mind-body distinctness, 
and on Descartes’ detailed argument to disambiguate the notion of sensation. 
I will focus on the latter aspect, and show that, contrary to standard 
interpretations, Descartes conceived of thought as propositional thinking and 
of the mind as an intellectual as well as volitional faculty deprived of any sort 
of imagery, and so that by ‘sensory ideas’ he understood, not phenomenal (and 
thus corporeal) presentations of objects, but propositional conceptions of 
states of affairs. This is why sensory ideas are suitable candidates for being the 
starting point of the proof. 
In section 1, I will introduce the issue of the alleged Cartesian equivocation 
on the notion of thinking, and argue that a pluralistic approach to it is plagued 
by fundamental problems. In section 2, I discuss the standard interpretation of 
the proof of the external world, and argue both that it is logically vulnerable 
and that it is unable to make sense of the text. In section 3, I propose an 
analysis of sensory ideas that is grounded on Descartes’ discussion on the 
material falsity of sensory ideas, and argue that it provides us with a certain 
datum about the epistemic value of the proof. In section 4, I reconstruct the 
proof, and show that it is far from negligible. Besides, I show how it clarifies 
several important issues, from the character of human sensation to the 
doctrine of the automatism of animals. The overarching thesis is that the 
Cartesian doctrine of the intellectual nature of human sense perception and his 
proof of the external world are closely related. 
1. DESCARTES ON SENSATION: THE RECEIVED VIEW 
It is part of the common lore of contemporary philosophy that Descartes 
was the originator of what might be called the “phenomenal conception of 
mind”, to wit, that he expanded the concept of mind to include, besides 
propositional attitudes and ‘pure’ acts of thinking, raw sensations, emotions 
and feelings: a private world of mental imagery that, under the technical rubric 
of ‘ideas’, was as epistemically unassailable as ontologically isolated from the 
objects that were their presumed causes. When this conception is combined 
with the Cartesian doctrine that the nature of the mental substance is thinking, 
the result is an extension of the meaning of the concept of thought, so that it 
covers a wide variety of mental events, from beliefs and decisions to 
sensations, and includes as a genus a subset of faculties that goes from 
intellectual understanding to imagination and sense perception. As a result, 
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thinking became for Descartes synonymous with consciousness, immediate 
awareness, or experience, terms which are the forerunners of direct 
acquaintance. 
Interpreters have not failed to notice that Descartes’ use of the word 
‘thought’ deviates from common usage,1 and that, throughout his writings, he 
seems guilty of equivocation on the notion of thinking, operating with two 
incompatible concepts: a restricted and propositional-orientated notion which 
he took from the Schools and which, according to Zeno Vendler, conforms 
with “the idea of thought that we have” (VENDLER 1991, p. 251), and the 
aforementioned extended notion that covers the whole of our mental life. 
Maybe the equivocation could be extenuated as a product of creative struggle, 
but the facts remain that the extended concept of thought takes precedence 
over the inherited conception (it seems more genuinely Cartesian), that this piece 
of revisionary metaphysics is unmotivated and counter-intuitive, and that it 
naturally leads to the infamous doctrine of the automatism of animals, whose 
lacking of thought entails lacking of sensory awareness.  
The nature of this entailment is, however, puzzling. In order to deny 
sensation to animals Descartes’ argument would seem to require both the 
general premise that sensation is a mode of thinking and the factual premise 
that animals do not think, namely, that they are deprived of conceptual or 
propositional thinking (‘thought’ in the restricted sense of the word). Insofar as 
it is quite plausible, the latter premise is necessary to warrant the conclusion 
that they do not have sensation. But all the logical force of the entailment 
depends on the former premise, which provides the middle term of the 
syllogism. The problem with this argument is that the middle term is equivocal, 
that there are then four terms in the syllogism, and so that the conclusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “However, French and Latin usage was never as wide as that found in Descartes; at no time 
was it natural to call a headache or a pang of hunger a cogitatio or pensée. In fact, Descartes was 
consciously extending the use of the words ‘cogitare’ and ‘penser.’ This is brought out by the 
misunderstandings of his contemporaries” (KENNY 1968, pp. 68-9).  
As I shall later argue, the misunderstandings were real, but their cause was not a supposed 
extension of the meaning of thought, but a complex theory of human perception. Human 
perception includes a raw sensation and an intellectual grasping of a thought: insofar as these 
two aspects are always conjoined in human experience, it is natural to call ‘sensation’ to the 
compound. Disambiguation is the task of the philosopher, who is not replacing common 
parlance, but clarifying it.  
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doesn’t follow: to play its part in the argument, sensation should have to be a 
mode of a thicker thought2 than mere phenomenal awareness.  
This leaves us with four interpretative options: (i) Descartes’ doctrines are 
irreparably inconsistent, he is guilty of an elementary blunder in logic; (ii) a 
Kantian approach which states that, according to Descartes, sensation is never 
possible without concepts, and so that substitutes a dualism based on the 
intrinsically intellectual nature of sensation itself for a dualism based on ‘pure’ 
experience (this approach would provide the thicker thought that saves the 
argument for the automatism of animals from being a formal fallacy);3 (iii) a 
resolute reading4 that claims that sensation, taken by itself, is neither a mode of 
thinking nor a mental event,5 that makes a sharp distinction between human 
and animal sensory awareness, and that underlines that, instead of extending 
the concepts of mind and thought, Descartes restricted both of them; and (iv) 
a pluralistic view that points out that the common element of all mental 
operations, however diverse they may be, is immediate awareness, and so that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I am borrowing this term from E. Sosa, who distinguishes between a thinner and a thicker 
notion of thought, capturing with such concepts the difference between imagery and 
propositional thinking. See SOSA (2007, pp. 10-11). 
3 That is the view proposed by James Hill in Descartes and the Doubting Mind. He claims that, 
insofar as the modes of imagining and sensing are relational (they depend on the intellectual 
and on the corporeal substances they relate), they “involve the intellect as a necessary 
constituent” (HILL 2012, p. 106), and so that, since Descartes denies an incorporeal substance 
to animals, “they are also incapable of sensory perception, hunger and pain in so far as these 
involve awareness and feeling and are not just the blind workings of the animal spirits and the 
mechanism of the body” (Id., p. 112). 
4 I am borrowing this term from a well-known approach to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, a reading 
that, taking Wittgenstein at his word, takes very seriously his closing comments on the 
nonsensical character of the doctrines promoted throughout the book. With regard to 
Descartes’ philosophy, it is the view I favour. Its nub is never to forget that one of the firmest 
points in the interpretation of Descartes is his robust conceptual dualism, and so that readings that 
threaten to blur the distinction between mental and physical states, or between personal and 
sub-personal faculties, are prima facie objectionable.    
5 According to this account, sensations are modes of corporeal substances. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that they are explainable in terms of extension (they are not). Our claim is dual: 
that sensations cannot be predicated of a thinking thing, and that they only can be predicated 
of particular bodies (animal and human bodies). In this sense, this reading is fully compatible 
with an attributive trialism (two ontological substances or referents, three irreducible categories) 
such as the one famously proposed by John Cottingham. See COTTINGHAM (1991a, pp. 236-
48).  
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refusing rationality to animals Descartes was not committed to refuse them 
phenomenal sensing.6        
Oddly as it seems the latter account is not only the vision of mind shared 
by most contemporary philosophers, but the more likely view that a charitable 
interpreter would attribute to Descartes. On the one side, and due to the 
Cartesian remapping of categories, toothaches and pains have become 
paradigmatic examples of mental states, at the same time that an austere and 
down-to-earth conception of thought has prevented the outrageous 
consequences of the Cartesian doctrine. Headaches are mental stuff, but not 
thoughts. Animals can be nonconceptual without being nonsentient. We can 
have it both ways: an expanded conception of mind together with a restricted 
notion of thought. On the other side, the previous conception could be 
presented as an interpretation (and a partial justification) of Descartes’ 
approach. It would be enough to make use of his definition of thought in 
terms of indubitable knowledge, that is, in terms of immediate awareness,7 and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Three out of the four options are revisionist in nature. The Kantian approach makes Descartes 
defend that sensation is a (partial) mode of conceptual thinking and that the nature of the 
mind is conceptual thinking (it is a view based on a restricted conception of the three elements 
involved: mind, thought and sensation). The resolute reading makes Descartes subscribe to the 
doctrines that sensation is a mode of corporeal substances and that the nature of the mind is 
conceptual thinking (it is an account grounded on a restricted view of only two of the elements 
involved: mind and thought). The pluralistic approach makes Descartes endorse that sensation 
is a mental event, but not a mode of thinking, and that the nature of the mind is consciousness 
(and so it combines an extended notion of the mind with a restricted notion of thought). 
It seems obvious that, though able to rescue the Cartesian argument from logical 
inconsistency, the Kantian reading confronts us with a view at least as unpalatable as the 
original one, adding to the automatism of animals the gratuitous postulate of an asymmetrical 
relation of dependency between experience (seeing a green patch) and propositional experience 
(seeing that a green patch is in front of me), and so exposing Descartes to the charges of 
leaving no space to sub-personal powers and of making of sensation (a paradigm, if any, of an 
unreflective operation) the result of a reflective and highly sophisticated process. For making 
sense of Descartes what has to be revised is the account of his supposed doctrines, and not of 
his supposed argument against the common sense conception of animals. Both the resolute and 
the pluralistic approaches would acquit Descartes of the charge of being (borrowing from John 
Cottingham) “a brute to the brutes”. See COTTINGHAM (1991c, pp. 163-72).   
7 “Thought. I use this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are 
immediately aware of it. Thus all the operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and 
the senses are thoughts” (AT VII 160 / CSM II 113). 
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focusing on content rather than verbal expression, to consider his misleading 
terminology as a mere holdover of his Scholastic education, to release his 
ground-breaking conception of the mind from verbal disputes. 
There are, however, at least two drawbacks of this approach. The first is 
that it leads to a division of the mind into two compartments, one containing 
phenomenal experiences and the other containing ‘thoughts’ in a quasi-Fregean 
sense of the word: constructions out of concepts that are the objects of a shared 
understanding (they are not private in the sense that sensations are private) and 
the subject-matter of a diverse range of propositional attitudes, such that they 
are the only candidates to become judgements, and so bearers of truth-values. 
That division of the mind becomes more accentuated after considering that, 
according to this view, awareness is the common aspect of the operations of 
diverse and mutually irreducible mental faculties, from rational powers to 
memory, imagination and sensory perception. This raises a battery of 
questions: Is this pluralistic conception of the mind not at odds with 
Descartes’ conspicuous doctrine of the indivisibility and the simplicity of the 
soul,8 a doctrine which explicitly opposes to the Aristotelian theory of the 
mind as composed of subminds? Are not propositional attitudes personal 
operations done by the whole mind, and so incapable to be explained by sub-
personal mechanisms? What is the role of awareness? Is not Descartes positing 
a useless monitoring device, useless since, instead of explaining and unifying 
mental operations, of providing for them the same ground of possibility, it is a 
concomitant aspect, a mere epiphenomenal appurtenance to those very 
operations? What these questions indicate is that Descartes’ definition of the 
mind in terms of certainty needs to be deeply reconsidered, but not because 
epistemological certainty is not the mark that he uses to identify mental items 
(it is). Rather because the scope of certainty is for him much more limited than 
for empiricists such as Locke and Russell.9 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
All the references to the works of Descartes are to volume and page in AT. According to 
the standard procedure, I have also used the English translation of Descartes’ philosophical 
writings by Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, and Kenny. 
8 See, for example, AT VII 86 / CSM II 59. 
9 As far as I am aware the only Cartesian scholar to notice that the demon scenario cast doubts 
upon phenomenal sensation, namely, upon qualitative feelings such as seeing a green patch, 
feeling a pain, or craving for a soft drink, is John Cottingham. From this very fact Cottingham 
mounts a searing criticism on Descartes, who, inasmuch as “the most (…) the hyperbolical 
doubt could allow him to assert as essential to his nature is that —in the narrowest sense— he 
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The second problem of this position is quite obvious. It is clear that 
Descartes didn’t attribute thought to animals. But it is not less clear that he 
refused them a mind or a soul (AT IV 576 / CSMK III 304). This means either 
that his verbal inheritances are too philosophical operative for comfort or that 
for him ‘mind’ and ‘rational mind’ are interchangeable expressions. 
2. THE PUZZLING NATURE OF DESCARTES’ PROOF OF THE 
EXTERNAL WORLD 
In a celebrated passage from the Second Meditation, Descartes provides a 
list of activities that indubitably pertain to a thinking thing: a thinking thing is 
“(a) thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and 
also imagines and has sensory perceptions” (AT VII 28 / CSM II 28). 
John Cottingham (COTTINGHAM 1991a, p. 238) has stressed the pause 
(captured by the Latin ‘quoque’ –‘and also’) that precedes the introduction of 
the capacities of imagination and sense perception, separating them from the 
first subset of the list, which contains ‘pure’ operations of the intellect and of 
the will. The oddity of presenting imagination and sense perception as activities 
of a thinking thing does not go unnoticed: Descartes, who later will call those 
faculties “special modes of thinking [my emphasis]” (AT VII 78 / CSM II 54), 
hastens to justify and clarify his claim, distinguishing between a ‘restricted’ and 
a lax meaning of ‘sensory perception’. In a restricted sense, seeing a green 
patch or feeling an excruciating pain is nothing else than seeming to see a green 
patch or to feel a pain (AT VII 29 / CSM II 28), seemings whose certainty is 
independent of the existence of an external world and of their veracity, and so 
that qualify as modes of thinking.10 Only those seemings, detached of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
thinks” is not justified to “move from ‘sum res cogitans’ to ‘sum res volens, sentiens, etc.’” 
(COTTINGHAM 1991b, p. 294).  
This critique, although based on a correct insight, would undermine any possible proof of 
the external world, preventing it to get off the ground. It makes imperative to identify some 
element that, conjoining epistemic certainty and unintelligibility in terms of a narrow self, could 
count as sensory perception or as “the ideas of sensible objects” (AT VII 79 / CSM II 55).     
10 In order to avoid unnecessary complications in this context, I have focused on sensory 
perception. Descartes justifies the introduction of the imagination as a mode of thinking 
inasmuch as mathematical imagining is a way to convey and represent necessary relations, one that is 
dependent on the will and is guided by the understanding. Passive imagination, namely, the 
involuntary and derivative (from sensory awareness) imagery of reveries, daydreams, and 
dreams, does not qualify as a mode of thinking. This doesn’t mean, however, that agency is 
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causal underpinnings and of their epistemic status, are mental operations. In 
his usual way, Descartes manages to plant in his readers the seeds of a material 
whose philosophical development will have to wait until the Sixth Meditation, 
where sense perception will be instrumental to the proof of the external world. 
The structure of this notorious proof is far from clear, but there seems to 
be something close to a consensus on some of its basic components. 
Firstly, it seems uncontroversial that, discerning a restricted meaning of 
sensation, Descartes is pointing towards a private world of pains and colours, 
that is to say, towards a realm of sensory ideas (or qualia) that, even if they are 
causally and systematically related to a physical order, are logically independent 
both of the corporeal process of information’s delivery and of the corporeal 
features presumably represented by their phenomenal contents. The mental 
order of sensory ideas is just independent of the physical order, whatever the 
latter may be. Accordingly, Descartes was an indirect realist, and thus he had to 
face the issues associated with such position, mainly the epistemological 
problem raised by the veil of ideas: how to come to terms with two irreducible 
and independent varieties of knowledge, the subjective and the objective.11 
Second, and regarding the structure of the argument, it is assumed that the 
proof is composed of three steps. On the first step, Descartes appeals to the 
involuntariness of our sensations, a fact that, ruling out the possibility of being 
himself the cause of his sensory ideas, points to an external cause. On the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
absent from human passive imagination: after all, and although reveries are not usually 
activated by the will, they are voluntary insofar as it makes sense to command a daydreaming 
person to focus. Imagining is attention-dependent, and attention (at least in many cases) is 
grounded on the will. For Descartes, even dreams are attended by reflection: the fact that 
sometimes, being aware that we are dreaming, it is up to us to interrupt (or not) the dream, 
seems to suggest interesting connections with the will, namely, with operations involving the 
whole person. On this issue, see, for instance, AT VII 358-9 / CSM II 248. 
It goes without saying that due to the crucial nature of this topic for a correct 
understanding of the Cartesian proof of the external world this is an issue to which we shall 
return.     
11 This reading seems neatly to fit with the first two grades of sensory perception such as they 
are presented in a celebrated passage from the Sixth Set of Replies. After all, the third degree 
of sensory response, inasmuch as it consists of judgements, “it is clear that it depends solely on 
the intellect” (AT VII 437 / CSM II 295), to wit, it is attributed to sensation only in virtue of a 
common mistake, as it were, as a sob to common parlance.  
On the other hand, I am using ‘objective knowledge’ in a restricted sense of the 
expression, limited to knowledge of the physical world. The Meditator enters the realm of 
externality and objectivity after achieving knowledge of God and of true natures.    
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second step, Descartes considers two scenarios: a Berkelian scenario where 
God (or another intellectual substance)12 is the cause of his sensations, and the 
commonsense belief that they “are produced by corporeal things” (AT VII 80 
/ CSM II 55). Insofar as the latter conviction is immediate, irresistible, and, 
unlike opinions that can be corrected by a proper use of reason, rationally 
incorrigible (one can discover that one’s former opinion about the size of the 
sun was wrong, but what would count as discovering that one was in error 
when believing that there is a physical world? Does it make sense to talk of 
‘beliefs’, and of ‘errors’ in this context?), it is one of the “teachings of nature”,13 
and so it would be a categorial mistake to put it on a par with opinions and 
possibilities such as the first hypothesis. In other words, the scenarios are 
incommensurable, our ‘belief’ in the external world is not just a belief among 
others; with a higher epistemic standing than opinions (including apt or 
veridical opinions), convictions of this sort are so closely related to our rational 
framework that their falsity would result in the discredit of reason itself.14 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The text mentions “some creature more noble than a body” (AT VII 79 / CSM II 55). It is 
seldom if ever asked why Descartes entertains these two related possibilities (and how they are 
related). Let us assume that the cause of our sense ideas is an intellectual creature (an angel or a 
demon). In such a case, our mistakes could not be imputed to God, but to our rushed 
judgements —judgements that we are able to withhold. But, even assuming that the cause of 
those ideas is God, this wouldn’t make of Him a deceiver (fallax), since our great propensity to 
believe that they come from physical objects is not a clear and distinct perception, but a 
psychological compulsion that, when reflecting, we are free to ward off. All this suggests that 
Descartes’ argument contains a clear and distinct perception, and that the content of that 
perception is that intellectual natures, whatever they may be (myself, an angel, or God), cannot be 
the cause of sensory ideas (understanding ‘sensory ideas’ in a very restricted sense that it will be 
unpacked when developing the problem of ideas that are materially false). If this is so, 
Descartes’ appeal to the veracity of God is either a red herring or at most a supplement to the 
proof itself. That Descartes had dissimulated on this issue is easily understandable, either 
because he consistently avoids expressions suggesting limitations of God or because of the 
metaphysical consequences of fleshing out his insight. 
13 On the teachings of nature, and the difference between them and the deliverances of the 
natural light, see AT VII 81-3 / CSM II 56-8. 
14 It would seem worth exploring the analogies between the Cartesian notion of “the teachings 
of nature” and the Wittgensteinian concept of “hinge beliefs” (however, I’ll say later 
something that, locating the similarities between the Cartesian proof of the external world and 
Wittgenstein’s hinge epistemology at a deeper level, discourages this specific line of research). 
Besides, it is interesting to notice that the three components that, according to Thomas Reid, 
make a perception (in contrast with a mere sensation), that is, “some conception or notion of 
the object”, “a strong and irresistible (…) belief of its present existence”, and the fact that this 
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Finally, Descartes nails the latter point down when appealing to the veracity of 
God. His point is that, since rational deliverances have been successfully self-
validated, the silent approval of reason is the equivalent of an indirect 
validation of our basic beliefs. Once the last authority of reason has been 
warranted, the possibility that our compulsive and natural ‘beliefs’ could be 
false no longer makes sense. 
There is much to say for the previous reconstruction, much more nuanced 
than common caricatures of the Cartesian proof.15 However, this should not 
blind us to the fact that it is far from convincing. There are at least three kinds 
of problems with this approach. The first group of problems concern the 
internal structure of the proof itself. In the first place, some parts of the proof, 
specifically, the supposed appeal to the involuntariness of sensations, are 
superfluous on this reading. After all, wouldn’t it be sufficient to invoke the 
teachings of nature to reach the desired conclusion? If so, there is a mismatch 
between this version of the argument and Descartes’ strict conception of logical 
validity, which rules out as formally invalid arguments containing a redundant 
or a useless clause.16 Given the highly structured nature of the Meditations, that 
mismatch militates prima facie against the standard account. The second 
shortcoming concerns the use of the teachings of nature as a step of the 
argument. It is not only that Descartes makes no explicit mention of this all-
important notion throughout the proof (he simply appeals to “a great 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
belief is “immediate” (REID 1941, p. 79), do possess unmistakable Cartesian resonances: a 
point that we should keep in mind in order to abstain from ascribing to Descartes the same 
doctrines of his empiricist successors.     
15 It is not as if Descartes were trying to gain access to the external world only from sensations. As 
Reid and Frege aptly noted, the private nature of sensations would make this procedure 
logically unfeasible. Consider the agreement between Reid and Frege on this point: 
“(…) for no sensation can give us the conception of material things, far less any argument 
to prove their existence” (REID 1941, p. 156). [This text contains another Cartesian resonance: 
the doctrine that sensations are materially false, namely, that they have either no content at all or 
an opaque content. On this important point, we will elaborate later.]  
“Having visual impressions is certainly necessary for seeing things, but not sufficient. 
What must still be added is not anything sensible. And yet this is just what opens up the 
external world for us; for without this non-sensible something everyone would remain shut up 
in his inner world” (FREGE 1997, p. 343). 
16 This is one of the main traits of Descartes’ antiformalism in logic, a trait that he borrows from 
the Pyrrhonian dialectics against the Stoics’ inference schemata, and that plays a conspicuous 
role on his dispute with Gassendi about the non-inferential nature of the cogito. For a detailed 
analysis of Descartes’ view about formal validity, see CURLEY (1978, pp. 30-4).   
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propensity to belief” [AT VII 80 / CSM II 55], and this seems rhetorical), but 
that, as Descartes himself makes clear, this concept only applies to nature “in 
(a) limited sense”, namely, to “the combination of mind and body” (AT VII 82 
/ CSM II 57), and so to those convictions whose content is unintelligible from a 
rational perspective. It would go against all the rules of logic to invoke the 
rationally opaque teachings of the composite’s nature to contrive a rational 
proof whose starting point is the sceptical mind, a mind that at this point of 
the Meditations ignores not only whether it is attached to a body, but whether it 
is intermingled with it. To conclude, this interpretation makes difficult to make 
sense of a passage almost immediately prior to the proof in which Descartes 
explicitly warns about calling upon natural impulses whose epistemic value is 
dubious.17 Moreover, if the teachings of nature were the crux of the argument, 
it would be up to a Berkelian to remind Descartes of his own doctrines, 
namely, of the fact that many things that seem “teachings of nature” really are 
“ill-considered judgements” (AT VII 82 / CSM II 56) solidified by habit and 
neglect, and so to cast doubts upon their epistemic status. This indicates that 
the teachings of nature are a non-starter, and that, unless the proof hinges on 
purely rational considerations, it is lacking the demonstrative standing to which 
it aspires.18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “I reckon that a great deal of confidence should not be placed in what I was taught by 
nature” (AT VII 77 / CSM II 53). 
18 One could say that instead of replying to the Berkelian qualms we are displacing them to a 
lower level. After all, and whatever may be the nature of Descartes’ proof of the external 
world, the fact is that he appeals to the teachings of nature in order to warrant the substantial 
union, the correct functioning of the composite (to attain welfare), and the general match 
between sensations and the objects they (obscurely) represent. Berkeley’s devastating questions 
legitimately reappear at this level, and with them the possibility of disconnecting our rational 
framework from what apparently are common sense beliefs, depriving the latter of any sort of 
rational support (including a default rationality). 
On this issue, it should be enough to remember that Berkeley’s whole case depends on his 
thesis that a material substance in unintelligible. As it will be discussed later, the main point of the 
Cartesian proof is to demonstrate that without a material substance our capacity to think 
particular objects or states of affairs would be impossible, and so that external objects are 
required in order to explain some of our mental activities. If Descartes is right, the teachings of 
nature are not exposed to Berkeley’s attack. Notice, however, that they only can fulfil an 
epistemic role after the proof of the external world, a proof that they are unable to provide, 
and that must be based on elements that, contrary to sensations, impart a clear and distinct 
conception of corporeal things.  
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Further problems arise from the isolated nature of the proof afforded by 
this widely accepted account, namely, from the fact that, abstracting from the 
methodically organized background whose upshot is a highly compressed 
argument, this reading deprives itself of evidential support, it is by its own 
nature blind to some puzzling questions instrumental to clarify Descartes’ 
meaning.  
The most significant of those questions are: (i) Why, rather than tackle the 
issue without further ado, does Descartes involve himself in a detailed 
discussion —the famous chilliagon passage (AT VII 72-3 / CSM II 50-1)— of 
the differences between pure understanding and imagination? Is he 
procrastinating or preparing the ground for the argument? (ii) Why is the first 
attempt to demonstrate the existence of material things, an attempt based on 
the mind’s power to imagining, a failure? What are the lessons learnt from this 
defeat and how they help to redirect Descartes’ procedures? Could this failed 
demonstration be used under further conditions, that is, could it, once the 
epistemic position of the Meditator is rectified, replace the proof from sensory 
perception without loss? (iii) Is it significant that the argument for mind-body 
distinctness immediately precedes the proof of the material world? If so, how 
does Cartesian robust dualism contribute to bridge the gap between the 
internal and the external? (iv) Why does Descartes put an end to the argument 
stating that what has been proved is “that corporeal things exist”, and that “at 
least they posses all the properties which I clearly and distinctly understand, 
that is, all those which (…) are comprised within the subject-matter of pure 
mathematics” (AT VII 80 / CSM II 55)? Is this passage an echo of a well-
known text from the First Meditation (AT VII 20 / CSM II 14)? Is Descartes 
limiting the scope of the proof? And if this is so, are those limits fixed by the 
understanding or by phenomenal sensation, by a purely cognitive way of being 
aware of the material world (the kind of awareness proper of a res cogitans 
attached to the human body or of a thinking thing present in the body “as a 
sailor is present in a ship” [AT VII 81 / CSM II 56]19) or by feelings? Are the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Descartes raised the same possibility under a different description, that of an angel externally 
related to a body, in a letter to Regius dated on January 1642 (see AT III 493 / CSMK III 206). 
The very fact that Descartes provides a conceptual niche for this sort of external or accidental 
relation militates against hylomorphic renderings of his philosophy of mind, those which, 
projecting Aquinas to Descartes, make of the human body something incomplete, that has to 
be actualized by the mind, and of the mind, considered in isolation, something intrinsically 
related to a particular body.   
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properties represented by phenomenal sensation clear and distinct, or rather 
obscure and confused? The replies suggested by those questions help to make 
sense both of why Descartes does not appeal to the teachings of nature to 
develop his argument and of the unequivocal gap (a change of issue) that 
separates the argument for the external world from the following discussion on 
sensation and the substantial union. 
Finally, this reading takes too much for granted, in particular, it takes for 
granted that when distinguishing a lax and a restrict meaning of “having a 
sensory perception” Descartes is slicing off the what-it-is-like aspect of 
experience. Nevertheless, there is an alternative view on Descartes’ meaning, 
one that underlines that he is not separating the bodily dispositions which are 
usually associate with sensations from qualitative sensations, but separating 
qualitative feelings from the reflective awareness of those feelings, namely, from 
the indubitable fact that, although it could be false that I am seeing a green 
patch or feeling a toothache, it still seems to me that I am seeing one thing or 
feeling the other. Those seemings are thoughts from which I cannot detach 
myself, formal acts of thinking as invulnerable to the hyperbolical doubt as the 
cogito itself. Their contents (that I am undergoing such and such affection, that 
I am seeing this or that item…) could be false, and yet it couldn’t be false that I 
am thinking (considering, believing, doubting…) about such an experience. 
Notice that that which could be false is not only that I am seeing a tree (in 
contrast with merely having a hallucination of a tree), but that I am having 
whatever sort of phenomenal experience, veridical or not. Notice too that Descartes 
invariably distinguishes sensation from perception, meaning by the latter “a 
perception of the intellect”. In this way, the narrower thinking that remains from 
this exercise of disambiguation is completely intellectualized, at the same time 
that, inasmuch as phenomenal contents are its subject matter, it is credited as 
sensory perception, understanding this latter term not as a sensorial mode of 
presentation (how things and properties are sensorially presented), but as a 
range of propositional attitudes applied to thoughts whose content is the 
phenomenal character of experiences. This reading seems better suited to at 
least three aspects of Descartes’ philosophy: his radical doubt (seriously taken), 
his description of sensory perceptions as modes of thinking, and his stringent 
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and technical use of words such as ‘perception’ and ‘ideas’ (including the ideas 
of sense).20 
The unpacking of Descartes’ distinction is, however, much more 
complicated than what is suggested by the previous account. As a matter of 
fact, this is a conceptual knot that, due to his immersion into the senses, the 
Meditator is not up to disentangle in a significant fashion until well into the 
Third Meditation. My guiding question is: Is the strict meaning of “having a 
sensory perception” invariant, or rather, that which the passage from the 
Second Meditation provides is a provisional distinction commensurate to a 
particular standpoint, a distinction which gestures to the right direction of 
enquiry, but which has to be widened? And if the latter is so, why cannot the 
former view be Descartes’ last word on the issue? I am confident to identify 
the sceptical pressure that compels Descartes to move a step further.21  
3. THE IDEAS OF CORPOREAL THINGS: A REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS 
In a groundbreaking article on Descartes’ use of skepticism, Deborah 
Brown (BROWN 2013, p. 25-42) argues that what marks Descartes’ departure 
from Pyrrhonism is an unparalleled and radical version of content skepticism, to 
wit, a kind of semantic skepticism whose main (but by no means the only) target 
are sensory ideas. Let us consider sensory ideas as explained above, that is, as 
thoughts whose contents are phenomenal: thoughts about sounds, colours, 
pains, etc., or, alternatively, thoughts about hearing sounds, seeing colours or 
feeling pains. Is there any problem with this sort of thoughts? 
For a start, phenomenal content would make a genuine and categorial 
distinction between thinking and sensing all but possible, and so it would 
undermine the general skepticism regarding experiences to which Descartes’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Descartes is eager to distinguish ideas from images, and to stress the propositional and 
conceptual character of the former (closely related to the pure understanding). Among many 
other texts, see the definition of ‘idea’ in the synthetic exposition of the Second Set of Replies 
(AT VII 160-1 / CSM II 113), or the harsh discussion with Hobbes on this point (AT VII 181 
/ CSM II 129-30). 
21 This reading is conditional to a serious interpretation of Descartes’ sceptical worries. I am 
aware that sceptical readings of the Meditations have been unfashionable for a couple of 
decades. But, besides the unacceptable consequences of wiping out this trend of Descartes’ 
thought, it seems that this fashion is becoming outmoded. See, as an example, the recent 
monograph by WAGNER (2014), or the current controversy involving FINE (2000), WILSON 
(2005), or BROWN (2013), on the relation between Cartesian and Ancient skepticism. 
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external stance towards sensations points. Put another way, even if one doesn’t 
know whether a particular phenomenal proposition (propositions whose 
contents are subjective experiences: that I am feeling cold…) is true, one seems 
able to grasp under which conditions it would be true, namely, to grasp the 
meaning of those items described as “suffering pain”, “seeing a blue patch”, 
“feeling cold”, and so on. In this way, content dogmatism (the view that truth 
conditions of sensory experiences are unproblematic) and token-to-token 
experiential skepticism are compatible. Nevertheless, content dogmatism 
presupposes that, insofar as the ultimate source of phenomenal content has to 
be experience itself (direct acquaintance with, say, the phenomenal character of 
the experience of red), most of our experiential beliefs are correct. This means, 
in turn, that phenomenal sensations cannot be completely externalized (from 
propositional thinking about them), and so that it is not possible a logical 
severance (in contrast to the accidental and the empirical) between the 
indubitable fact that I am thinking about a phenomenal content and the 
phenomenal experience on which I am thinking. Sensory ideas and 
phenomenal experiences are logically interrelated, and so they stand or fall 
together.  
That Descartes thought that they fall together is a point that the discussion 
on the material falsity of sensory ideas (AT VII 43-5 / CSM II 29-31) helps to 
make clear, a discussion where both acts of thinking and objects of thought are 
severely restricted.  
Ideas of what Locke would later call “secondary qualities” are materially 
false insofar as they “represent non-things as things” (AT VII 43 / CSM II 30), 
and so “provide subject-matter to error” (AT VII 231 / CSM II 162). A way of 
unpacking Descartes’ meaning is by pointing to the kind of error he has in 
mind, and then by providing an account on the sources from which that error 
stems. The error in question is the common tendency to think that sensations 
represent positive properties of bodies that resemble their phenomenal character, 
namely, that ‘pain’ or ‘coldness’, understood in terms of experience, and not in 
terms of extension and movement (as “leg’s damage” or as “a slow movement 
of particles”) are (or could be) positive properties of corporeal items. This is 
for Descartes a categorial error, one that involves projecting into the physical 
realm psychological aspects that are inherent to experience, thus blurring the 
distinction between how information is presented to a sentient being and a 
reductivist view of physical properties. Corporeal properties have to be 
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explained in terms of corporeal notions, a point which rules out an understanding 
of the physical world in terms of irreducible phenomenal ‘properties’. 
However, this is only part of the story (and a part that Descartes 
downplays when bringing material falsity to focus). It is not only that sensory 
ideas cannot be applied to a particular domain, but that they are opaque, namely, 
that they do not provide an intelligible notion or conception of the items that they 
presumably represent, a notion that could help a rational or discursive being to 
recognize and identify them. Notice that, instead of misrepresenting objects, 
sensations represent “non-things as things,” namely, that they do not represent at 
all (or, at least, that their objective contents are so elusive that by inspecting them 
we cannot know what, if any, is the reality that they represent, or, ceteris 
paribus, that they are). In this sense, the source of the aforementioned error is 
not so much a categorial mistake as an illusion of contents and of possible (conceivable) 
realities: the illusion of thinking that we understand something (experience and 
its modes) that, being intrinsically elusive, cannot be conceptually approached, 
and, of course, to make of a realm opaque to propositional thinking the very 
model of understanding! Deprived of “objective reality”, or, in other words, of 
an intelligible content that we could verbally pinpoint and share, that could 
mirror or be mirrored by something apart from unordered experience itself, 
qualia cannot be objects of (rational) thinking: Mary, in her black and white 
laboratory, could have a perfect understanding of what physical pain is without 
ever having felt it.22 For Descartes, it makes no sense to ask what kind of 
properties phenomenal properties are. 
It is curious to notice that, when approaching the problem of ideas 
materially false, most interpreters raise this issue from the perspective taken by 
Arnauld in his criticism of this Cartesian notion, ignoring both that Descartes 
would accept Arnauld’s critique if what he meant were what Arnauld took him 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This does not make of Descartes an epistemic eliminativist, that is, a dogmatic philosopher 
who thinks of the limits of the understanding as the very limits of reality. On the contrary, 
pointing to a realm irreducible to rational understanding, Descartes fixed the possibilities and 
the limits of his rationalism. Curiously enough, those limits are not (up to a certain point) in 
the domain of conceptual and universal thinking, but in the domain of nonconceptual and 
particular experience. On the other hand, the case of Mary, so relevant in the contemporary 
philosophy of mind, is paralleled by the Cartesian example of the res cogitans in the machine.  
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to mean, and that the point of Descartes’ reply was to show that Arnauld 
didn’t really understand his doctrine.23  
Arnauld is concerned about the formal dimension of ideas, namely, about the 
fact that they are ideas of something, that they have a specific content. His point 
is that, since every idea must have a positive content which is independent of 
whether it refers to a positive property of things or not, from the fact that the 
idea fails to refer it does not follow that the idea of, say, cold, is false, this 
meaning that it lacks a positive content. Lack of reference does not entail lack 
of content. Moreover, to have an idea implies to have a positive conception of 
something, and so it makes no sense to consider the possibility of ideas 
without content, of ideas of nothing at all. 24 For Arnauld, to have a false idea of 
cold is equivalent to have a false conception of what it is for a physical item to 
be cold, that is, it is to refer an idea that represents something “real and 
positive to me” (AT VII 207 / CSM II 145) to something that does not 
correspond to that content. It is not thus the content what is false, but the 
judgement that this idea is a correct representation of a physical item. This is 
why Arnauld accuses Descartes of confusing judgments and ideas, a charge 
that could be rephrased by saying that he (Descartes) confused the 
representational value of an idea with its intentional content, the “of” of reference 
with the “of” of intentionality, seeing a failure in representing as a sharp decrease in 
meaning.  
That the previous view cannot be attributed to Descartes is something 
borne out by the philosopher’s insistence on making clear that he is not taking 
ideas formally, as “representing something” (AT VII 232 / CSM II 163),25 but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 This is why Descartes says that “instead of meeting him head on I will dodge his blows,” 
insisting that “when I wrote what I did, I meant it in another sense [than Arnauld’s],” and 
accusing Arnauld of concentrating “on ideas taken in the formal sense” (AT VII 231 / CSM II 
162).   
24 In order to be subjects of predication ideas have to have a positive content. In this way, 
Arnauld reads Descartes as rejecting the very ground that makes possible to predicate of 
sensory ideas their “falsehood”. This predication would undermine its very conditions of 
possibility, being self-stultifying or self-refuting.   
25 Notice the ambiguity of the expression “as representing something”. This could be read as 
Descartes saying that he is not taking ideas “inasmuch as they have content” (the content that 
the idea presents to me) or, alternatively, that he is not taking them “insofar as they refer to an 
external item.” Since it is content that makes (successful or unsuccessful) reference possible, 
both senses are logically related. Anyway, in reversing Arnauld’s perspective Descartes is 
suggesting that he does not accept the two main theses attributed to him by his opponent: that 
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materially, as acts of thinking or “operations of the intellect” (AT VII 232 / CSM 
II 163). When saying that the idea of cold is materially false, Descartes’ 
meaning is not that its content is false, that it falsely represents what physical 
coldness is, but that there is no content, and so that it is a false act of thinking, 
namely, that we think that we are thinking (understanding, conceiving…) 
something, when in fact we are having a sensation. The whole point of 
Descartes is that having a sensation is not thinking about something, and so 
that there is no idea of cold. In other words, Arnauld reads Descartes as 
explaining the lack of content in terms of lack of reference, when Descartes’ 
explanation moves in the opposite direction: it is because sensory ideas do not 
have a positive reality (we do not know what they are) that they fail to 
represent or to misrepresent (in this context both predicates would be 
nonsensical: there is no content which could hit the target or fail to do it). 
Sensory ideas do not present something “real and positive to me”: this is why 
they are not ideas, something quite different from saying that they are ideas 
without a positive content.26 Thus, Arnauld misses both points: Descartes’ 
motivation and Descartes’ meaning. 
This view is further substantiated by Descartes’ appeal to the ideas of God 
“which are concocted by idolaters” (AT VII 233 / CSM II 163), that is to say, 
to concepts whose contents are contradictory. Those ideas could also be called 
“materially false”. Descartes’ point is that when taking ourselves as thinking 
contradictory concepts we are confusing a simulacrum of thought, a mere verbal 
activity, with a real act of thinking, with a real operation of the understanding. 
Insofar as contradictory ideas are deprived of an intelligible content, we are 
unable to think them, and so they are not ideas at all. Intelligibility, that is, 
perception by the intellect, is the mark of ideas, a mark that contradictions miss 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
he presupposes that sensory ideas do have content (and so, that they are ideas), and that the 
problem he is dealing with is that of misrepresentation.   
26 Notice that Descartes is quite explicit on the above points. On the one side, he says that 
“whether cold is a positive thing or an absence does not affect the idea I have of it, which 
remains the same as it always was” (AT VII 232 / CSM II 163), making clear that he is not 
dealing with the idea’s failure to refer. On the other side, he points to his real worries (the 
conceptually elusive nature of experience) when saying that “if I consider the ideas of cold and 
heat just as I received them from my senses, I am unable to tell that one idea represents more 
reality to me than the other” (AT VII 232 / CSM II 163). Notice that the problem is what 
reality, if any, a sensory idea represents to me, not what external reality, if any, it represents. 
Descartes casts the issue in terms of sinn, not of bedeutung.  
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due to a formally defective union of positive contents, and sensations miss due 
to their opacity. The important point is, however, that contradictions and 
“sensory ideas” are related as simulacra of thinking, or, alternatively, as simulacra of 
meaning, that they belong to the same genus of fake intellectual operations.  
Notice too that, for Descartes, our ideas are not separate items enjoying a 
kind of semi-independent mental existence, quasi-things that populate the 
transparent realm of the mind, and that are the privileged candidates of 
apprehensive and thinking acts. By ‘idea’ Descartes means “the form of any 
given thought” (AT VII 160 / CSM II 113), which in turn means that the idea 
cannot be separated from the act of thinking it, that we are aware of our ideas 
in so far as we are aware of the activity of thinking them. The outcome is that 
there is no residual thinking of an idea if the idea is unintelligible. Sensations 
cannot be objects of thought, and so they are deprived of the certainty that 
thinking provides to its objects. The whole notion of phenomenal ideas 
collapses.27 
The upshot of Descartes’ analysis is that the only sensory ideas properly so 
are ideas of primary qualities, namely, ideas whose contents (size, extension, shape, 
position, movement, duration and number…) are transparent to the pure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Interpreters have mainly focus on the issue whether sensations intrinsically misrepresent their 
objects or whether sensory misrepresentation is due to extrinsic features, namely, to erroneous 
judgments based on phenomenal items. Descartes is keen to underline that sensations are not a 
guide to truth, that “no falsity can occur in them” (AT VII 438 / CSM II 298), that is, that they 
are not truth-bearers, and that they play a functional role in the welfare of the individual, 
stressing so that sensory misrepresentation must be understood in terms of harsh judgements 
or misleading conceptions that “we formed without any reflection in our early childhood” (AT 
VII 438 / CSM II 295) and that we are able to correct. 
The curious thing is that both parties have thought that the problem of ideas materially 
false bears on this issue. It is thus important to distinguish the point of Descartes’ doctrine: 
that sensations provide no intelligible access to the world, that they fail to represent something 
to the intellect; from the separated topic (addressed in the second half of the Sixth Meditation) of 
what, how and why sensations represent in the context of the substantial union. The latter issue is 
explicitly circumscribed by Descartes to a domain beyond the pale of pure understanding, and 
so it makes sense to state at the same time that sensations do not represent at all (to the 
intellect), that they represent (clearly) physical items (to the sentient ego), and, inasmuch as 
they are non-epistemic in character, that they do not inherently misrepresent their objects. 
That sensations are not guilty of common errors is illustrated by the cases of the amputated leg 
and the man with dropsy, where errors result from a bad reading of the situation (a deficient 
understanding of the context), and not from sensations. 
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understanding. 28 Descartes’ suggestion is that we only can make sense of 
something in terms of primary qualities, that to entertain a possible physical 
reality is to understand its position in a spatiotemporal domain. Notice, 
however, that this understanding is conceptual and propositional, that it doesn’t 
require any sort of visual imagery, either austere or phenomenally loaded. 
None succession of images constitute the process of thinking about 
something. Images are at most features accidentally attached to thinking. One 
can understand that a thing is to the left of the table or that two items are really 
the same without having to evoke ‘mental’ pictures of the situations so 
described. What marks the difference between visual representations involving 
primary qualities and sensations is that in many cases the former, but not the 
latter, are a suitable medium to convey thought, to wit, that the ideas conceived 
but the intellect can easily be represented in this format. But the medium is not the 
message. Moreover, given the possibility of understanding particular situations 
without images, the strict distinction between ideas (intellectual acts) and visual 
presentations, and the fact that pictures are not by themselves acts of thinking 
(they do not contain their own meaning), but items that can manifest, convey 
or be accompanied by thought, it is imperative for Descartes to separate 
sensory ideas from any sort of experience.29     
Notice too that Descartes is talking about particular acts of thinking, about 
our understanding of particular items or situations as such and such, as with a 
concrete size, position, duration, essence or identity. At the end of the day, 
with “sensory ideas” Descartes means the recognitional and interpretative 
power of the mind, he points to thoughts that are exercises of intelligence, to 
intellectual actions that might be performed good or badly, with or without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  They are things that the Meditator “perceive(s) clearly and distinctly” (AT VII 43 / CSM II 
30). 
29 The objects of understanding are wider than the objects of representation. It is thus worth to 
underline that the genus of intelligible/conceivable objects could be divided, depending on 
whether they can be visually represented and on their possible modes of representation, in 
three sub-groups: (i) God, the self, and the common notions are intelligible but not 
representable; (ii) the essential relations that constitute mathematical objects can be 
represented in a spatial vacuum (without including the position of an empirical self); (iii) 
particular items only can be represented in a self-centered space and time. Empirical 
imaginings are a special case: they are not given in a vacuum, but they don’t depend, unlike 
perceptions, on the actual corporeal position of the imagining person. In any case, Descartes 
relates the spatial vacuum of abstract mathematical representations to the faculty of 
imagination.   
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success. They are different from clear and distinct perceptions, which taken by 
themselves are not actions, but direct and immediate apprehensions, passive 
mental states that couldn’t be described with sense as ‘intelligent’ or ‘stupid’, 
‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’.30     
In the strictest sense, “having a sensory perception” boils down to these 
fully-intellectualized thoughts that, defining the very limits of the indubitable 
self, are the only starting point possible for a proof of the external world.  
Several important elements emerge from the previous discussion.  
For one, a suitable starter that conforms to the stringent criteria imposed 
by radical scepticism and whose contents are shareable and objective.  
In second place, a well-grounded distinction between two different powers of 
the intellect: the intuitive capacity of the mind to apprehend the necessarily 
connected attributes of items for which there are no sensory correlates and 
whose intelligibility is, besides independent of a representational or relational 
framework, either unsuitable to any kind of representation (the self, God, 
common notions) or suitable to abstract representation (a kind of 
representation where there isn’t a particular spatial relation between the image 
and the subject’s body); and the understanding of particular items, which is 
corrigible, context-dependent and suitable to visual representation, meaning by 
the latter that, although we understand those items without the help of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This does not entail that the intellectual process culminating in clear and distinct perceptions 
could not be described as an active and intelligent performance. The point is just that we 
cannot either fail to understand or understand only up to a certain point intuitive necessary 
relations, that in the case of intuitive knowledge there is no gap between the items we perceive 
and our perception of them. The distinction between states and exercises of intelligence, so 
prominent in the current debate between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists on knowing-
how and intelligent action, sheds light on Descartes’ analysis of the twin abilities of the mind. 
Nevertheless, my opinion is that contemporary paradigm cases of states of intelligence, such as 
entertaining the thought that the number of the stars is odd, would be considered by Descartes 
as exercises of understanding, as intellectual performances that, inherently partial and relative, 
could be corrected or re-interpreted. He would reserve a complete, and so a passive 
understanding, to intuitive apprehensions. Note, by the way, that I am talking about a complete 
understanding (where “complete” is a qualitative adjective which refers to a firm or invulnerable 
apprehension), something compatible with an inadequate knowledge (a term which, together 
with its opposite, refers not to the quality, but to the extension of knowledge: adequate 
knowledge is all-inclusive, inadequate knowledge is partial and unfinished), a knowledge that 
falls short of the divine. Contrary to common views, Cartesian certainty and epistemic humility 
are not incompatible: we don’t get a firmer grasp of the Pythagorean Theorem by extending our 
understanding of the nature of the triangle.    
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imagery, they are objects that could easily be represented within a self-centered 
space and time, in an empirical concretum that, as focal points, insert us into 
space and time. So, in a sense, particular understanding seems to require a 
positioned and embodied mental operation in a way that both intuitive 
perceiving and mathematical imagining do not. It is thus imperative to provide 
an account of this highly peculiar intellectual power, irreducible to the pure 
understanding of essential and universal relations. The quest for an appropriate 
explanation of this indubitable intellectual ability will establish the bridge to the 
external world.31  
Finally, a clear awareness that the only obstacle that prevents an inference 
from the mental fact that we entertain particular thoughts to the condition that 
makes this power possible, is that those ideas might have been produced by 
some unknown power of the mind, that is, that “it seems possible that they are 
contained in me eminently” (AT VII 45 / CSM II 31). Overcoming this 
sceptical possibility requires stripping the self of accidental features, in such a 
way that the essential operations of the mind are constitutively unable to 
explain our thinking of particular items. If in its strictest sense the mind is 
incapable to produce those thoughts by itself, the certainty pertaining to them 
will contain something else than the mind itself. 
These are the three building blocks from which Descartes construes the 
proof of the Sixth Meditation. It is curious to notice to what extent Frege and 
Descartes shared intuitions on this point, how smoothly Descartes’ argument 
fits into Frege’s description of the form that a proof of the external world 
should take. These are words that could easily be put in Descartes’ mouth: 
So perhaps, since the decisive factor lies in the non-sensible, something non-
sensible, even without the co-operation of sense impressions, could also lead 
us out of the inner world and enable us to grasp thoughts (FREGE 1997, p. 
343). 
4. THE OBJECTIVE NATURE OF HUMAN SENSE PERCEPTION. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Descartes introduces this second power of the mind in the wax passage at the end of the 
Second Meditation. As a matter of fact, the main purpose of that controversial text is to bring 
this recognitional power to the attention of the Meditator, as Ben Mijuskovic forcefully argued 
in a much-ignored masterpiece: “Descartes’s Bridge to the External World: The Piece of Wax”. 
See MIJUSKOVIC (1991, pp. 312-28). 
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Now we should be able to pull the several strands of our discussion 
together.  
Two salient points in the remarks antecedent to the Cartesian proof are 
both the distinction between the power of understanding and the powers of 
mathematical imagining and of having sensory perceptions, and the epistemic 
and logical primacy accorded to the former power, which is the independent 
logical ground for the latter powers.32 Notice that Descartes cast the discussion 
in terms of powers, capacities or faculties, and that, although different from, to 
anticipate, pure understanding, imagination and sensory perception are of the 
same category: they are special modes of thinking, to wit, modes of understanding 
delimited by the very nature of the thinking substance and which include “an 
intellectual act (…) in their essential definition” (AT VII 78 / CSM II 54). This 
substantiates our claim that pointing to a distinctive “power of understanding” 
Descartes is demarcating, not an abstract universal, but pure understanding, 
namely, unconditional understanding or understanding under tautological conditions, 
this meaning the sort of innate understanding that the Meditator has learnt to 
exercise from the cogito argument and whose objects (God, the self, the 
intuitive principles of logic, etc.) are constituted by essential aspects that the 
mind pulls from within itself, without further pre-conditions or requirements 
to make use of it. The self-presentation of the cogito, independent of how the 
world is or even of whether there is a world, the understanding of an 
unconditional ground for possibilities, independent of what contingent 
possibilities, if any, have been actualized, or the understanding of the necessary 
attributes of mathematical figures, independent of whether they exist or not, 
are prominent examples of a kind of understanding 33  that, making facts 
intelligible, is not based on any fact (or information) whatsoever.34       
How to describe the relation between pure understanding and the two 
special modes of thinking? One option would be a conceptualist reading which, 
making of the thinking substance nothing else than the collection or addition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See especially AT VII 73 / CSM II 51, and AT VII 78 / CSM II 54. 
33 A kind of understanding that, although detachable and independent, constitutes a necessary 
condition for all ways of understanding, and so that it is a constitutive ingredient in all the 
possible operations of the intellect. 
34 Notice that the simple present tense in which those acts of thinking are expressed (the “I 
think” of the cogito argument) does not indicate a unique moment that could be identified (and 
re-identified) within a temporal framework or under some description. On the contrary, it 
singles out a moment that dangles in a temporal void, an indefinite and detached present.   
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of its modes (GLOUBERMAN 1991, pp. 363-84), would contend that 
unconditional understanding is another mode of understanding, and that the 
genus understanding is but an abstract noun which, referring to no concrete 
power, singles out a particular series of related but different operations. An 
alternative reading would preserve the robust asymmetry between substance 
and modes so prominent in Descartes’ metaphysics, and, availing itself of the 
distinction between determinables and determinates to shed light on the logical 
relations of a substance with its modes, would think of understanding as the 
undetermined essence of the mind, an essence determined by its modes 
(including unconditional understanding). 
Those two interpretations cannot be, however, correct. On the one hand, 
Descartes explicitly emphasizes that imagination and sensory perception are 
modes of understanding, and so that understanding is the essence of the mind 
(and not another mode). On the other hand, understanding is a distinctive, 
determined and specific power, independent of imagination and sensory 
perception. The problem is to make sense of both claims. Making a substance 
of understanding, the first claim pulls us to see it as a determinable. Modelling 
it as a distinctive power, the second claim invites the reader to see it as a kind 
of understanding, namely, as a mode. The problem is how imagination and 
sensory perception can be modes of unconditional understanding when they 
are not performances or examples of this power. 
On dealing with this topic, Descartes’ approach is rooted in a Neoplatonist 
model, something that, by my lights, does not make it unfamiliar or far-
fetched. Descartes’ point is that this is an asymmetrical relation such as the 
concept of unconditional understanding does not include the understanding of 
particular items, but the concept of the latter includes and integrates the former. 
In this sense, unconditional understanding grounds, but not exhausts, other 
ways of understanding. Put another way, all the operations of the intellect 
presuppose and include the logical framework that is the intentional object of 
pure understanding, and that make their objects intelligible. Thinking an item is 
thinking a set of norms that govern, constrain and make possible the 
understanding of all the appearances. Particular thinking goes accompanied 
with an implicit understanding of nomological facts, an understanding that 
methodical reflection makes explicit. This continual thought is the enduring 
subject/act of changing thoughts, the substance that determines and permeates 
the range of its modes. If Descartes highlights the distinctive nature of 
unconditional understanding is to emphasize the gap between the logical 
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framework valid for all possible worlds and the understanding of states of 
affairs that, besides the former, requires another normative scaffolding whose 
contents neither can be derived from the basic principles furnished by 
unconditional understanding alone nor are to be found or observed among the 
particular aspects of sense experience. It is this unbridgeable gap, combined 
with the fact that, according to Descartes, neither imagination nor sensory 
perception constitute “the essence of the mind” (AT VII 73 / CSM II 51), 
namely, that unconditional understanding is a power that, by itself, is able to 
define a complete substance,35 what makes possible for Descartes to conclude both 
that pure intellectual substances alone cannot explain understanding of 
particular items and that this power is essentially and constitutively related to 
the physical world. Based on a set of considerations whose ultimate ground is 
that the notion that we can have powers based on nothing is senseless, the 
Cartesian proof is far from negligible.36  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 “Now I can clearly and distinctly understand myself as a whole without these faculties 
[imagination and sensory perception]…” (AT VII 78 / CSM II 54). 
I would favour an epistemological, and not an ontological reading of this claim. 
Unconditional understanding defines the basic structure of a substance, but it does not say 
anything about how this structure is or could be instantiated. Clear and distinct perceptions are 
always true of something, but the nature of its truth-maker varies whether considered in 
isolation or considered in context. In other words, logical independence does not entail ontological 
isolation. This is, however, compatible with a robust empirical and conceptual dualism. 
36 Why does not Descartes cast the proof in terms of mathematical imagination? Why is not 
this power able to provide the basis for a demonstrative proof of the existence of the body, 
and only furnishes a probable conjecture? In my opinion, there are at least two reasons that 
make of abstract imagination a non-starter. Firstly, mathematical imagination is the visual 
representation of the deliverances of the pure understanding of the necessary attributes of 
geometrical figures, which means that the necessities that imagination represents are nothing else 
than the unconditional necessities grasped by the pure intellect, and so that the very limits of the 
latter are inbuilt in imagination (after all, the existence of the physical world cannot be deduced 
from logical principles alone). Whether or not there is a physical world, those necessities are 
true of something. Certainly, it seems more probable to think of geometrical essences as 
structural features of the extended substance, and so as truths whose truth-maker is the physical world 
(at the end of the day, this is Descartes’ position on the disputed topic of the ontology of 
possibilia). The problems are that the limited standpoint of the Meditator at this point leaves 
more options open (essentialism), and that the physical world to which geometrical properties 
would give access is far too austere and indeterminate. In second place, and insofar as 
imagination is visual, it does conform neither to the stringent criteria set by radical scepticism 
nor to the propositional understanding which fixes the range of the indubitable self.    
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Notice, however, that the crux of the argument lies in a groundbreaking 
extension of rationality that adds unexpectedness to novelty,37 and so that the 
proof parallels with different contents the same procedure that in the Fifth 
Meditation made possible to support the objectivity of essential relations.  
Descartes’ point is that to be understood particular items have to be 
located within a net of necessities beyond the realm of abstract logical principles, 
necessities that the mind is incapable to reject and so that we grasp as the limits 
that regulate the understanding of the appearances perceived by the senses. 
Necessary principles such as causal sequentiality, ‘sameness’ (identity through 
change), regularity of change (things cannot pop in and out of existence), 
indefinite and continual temporal succession, etc., govern and enrich the scarce 
data provided by the senses: they are the mental ingredient of human 
experience, namely, of experience that conjoins intellectual agency with sensory 
awareness, and so that is inherently objective. These are the “fundamental 
principles of human enquiry” (WITTGENSTEIN § 670),38 principles that are 
activated, but, unlike what happens in the Aristotelian model of abstraction and 
sensory transmission of rules and universals, not conveyed by the senses, that, 
unlike facts, are not explicitly taught, and that, inasmuch as they fix all possible 
experience, can be neither subject to testing nor confirmed by evidence.  
That those principles conform to a physical world external to the mind is, 
for Descartes, secured by two considerations. Firstly, by a causal argument that 
points out that we could not make use of those principles unless they were 
activated or elicited by some mechanism or other to receive a flow of 
information from objects (sensory awareness as the paradigm case), that is, that 
understanding requires a raw material to which it applies. In second place, by 
an argument analogous to the one developed in the Fifth Meditation, where 
mathematical essences, insofar as they contain necessities and that some of 
those necessities are unforeseeable and so able to be discovered by the subject, 
give us externality. That the mind is incapable of rejecting the net of necessities 
regulating empirical appearances assures that they are not fictions, and so that 
they express objective and true norms, norms that are true of something. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 According to the common wisdom, is not the Cartesian philosophy the very paradigm of a 
minimal, restricted, and myopic conception of rationality? 
38  This reference to Wittgenstein is far from idle. It seems to me that Descartes and 
Wittgenstein are exploring the same territory, extending the normative beyond the principle of 
contradiction, and wagging an attrition war in two fronts: against conventionalist 
interpretations of rules, and against empiricist reductions of them.  
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However, and unlike geometrical essences, the only possible candidate to be 
their truth-maker is the physical realm they govern (after all, principles 
regulating experience are not prone to foster essentialist illusions): causal 
sequentiality and identity through change do not operate in a vacuum; to be 
true they have to relate some items or others. 39  Externality is further 
substantiated by the fact that this immutable framework allows us to encounter 
and recognize particular identities and differences, and so to form with the help 
of sensory information illuminated by reflection a web of mutually limiting concepts, 
and to elucidate further logical relations among concepts, relations that are 
local or contextual. Logical limits are thus, in a sense, inexhaustible. 
Curiously, on the topic whether a proof of the external world is possible or 
not, Descartes would align himself neither to Malebranche nor to Arnauld.40 
Against Malebranche, he would contend that something else than revelation or 
faith is possible on this matter. Against Arnauld, he would point out that the 
argument is not based on God’s veracity, and that at most this latter basis 
would warrant the argument at the meta-level, as it were, from a perspective 
external to the argument itself. 
The picture of human sense perception that emerges from the previous 
discussion is that of a composite power that includes two discrete capacities 
working in tandem: sensory awareness as well as understanding. Facing the 
puzzle of how it is possible that, sensations being nonconceptual, the thought that 
I have a certain sensation is conceptual, and so the object of understanding, 
Descartes would say that, although the content of the thought that I am feeling 
a toothache is irreducible to the thought that there is damage in my tooth, it is 
the understanding of the latter situation, that is, the ability to recognize certain 
external criteria and patterns, what permits to identify my unsaturated 
sensation as a pain, and as a specific kind of pain, and so to sublate41 sensations 
into concepts that become embedded in a system of knowledge. Sensations are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This means that necessary relations do have an existential import, namely, that they have to be 
instantiated in order to be true. The objective truths of logic (in an extended sense of the 
word) are thus ontological indicators: a point that is consistently used by contemporary logicians 
(McGinn is only one case among others), and so that seems not too unreasonable.   
40 See on this topic NADLER (1989, pp. 133-35). 
41 This is the term used to translate Hegel’s aufheben. I have chosen this term because it 
integrates a negative sense (to abolish, to transcend) and a positive one (to preserve). The latter 
aspect fits well with Descartes’ non-eliminativist approach to sensations. The former reflects 
the gap between phenomenal experience and understanding.    
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only indirectly understandable. Transparent concepts (and so, public, objective, 
and necessary relations) do not come from private introspection. The idea is 
that, for Descartes, human beings, even if their minds are intermingled with 
their bodies or even if the exercise of the intellect is hindered by passions, 
never lose their thinking and reflective nature. Although this nature is not 
present in sensory awareness per se, it is constitutive of the construction of 
concepts and the epistemic agency that attend to it. On the one side, this 
means that Descartes is not obliged to deny sensory awareness to animals: 
lacking understanding, they are able to have a headache without knowing that 
they have it.42 On the other side, Descartes’ point is that agency is present (as 
an attached factor) even in those cases where bodily cognitive mechanisms 
operate by default. This acquits him of the charge of suppressing the sub-
personal, while settling a close kinship between his philosophy and 
contemporary forms of agential virtue epistemology, that is, of a virtue 
epistemology that makes of agency an essential ingredient of knowledge.43   
The Cartesian argument could be encapsulated as «I think, therefore the 
physical world exists». We have argued that a robust conceptual dualism leads 
to a dimension of the mind with contains within itself the structure of the 
physical world, and so that it is constitutively related to it. One could thus say 
that an external and accidental relation based on the senses is consistent with 
an internal and necessary relation grounded on the understanding, that an 
empirical dualism is compatible with a transcendental union of mind and world. But 
unpacking the full implications for the metaphysics of mind of this thought 
would mean to reconsider Descartes’ theory of modality and so to shed light 
on some of its neglected aspects.                  
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42 Once we pay attention to the fact that, when advancing his doctrine of the three grades of 
sensation, Descartes is describing and analysing human sensation, this reading fits well with his 
remark that only the physical aspects of sensation (the first grade of sensation) are common to 
animals and human beings. Inasmuch as the mind is intermingled with the body, the subject 
that perceives phenomenal sensation is the mind, something that does not happen in the case 
of animals and that does not entail that animals (animal bodies) do not feel sensations. 
43 Obviously, I’m thinking of Ernest Sosa, and his most recent version of virtue epistemology. 
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